

SECRET

15 DEC 1975

COMPARISON BETWEEN OPTION 4 OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION GROUP
AND PROPOSED OPTION X OF DCI AS REGARDS RESPONSIBILITIES
AND POSITION OF THE SENIOR U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
(* in left column indicates difference in options)

RELATIONSHIPS/
RESPONSIBILITIES

IOG OPTION 4

DCI OPTION X

Position in Executive
Branch hierarchy

Advisor to President

Advisor to President

Relationships:

To White House

Advisory

Advisory

To NSC*

Advisor

Non-voting member

To National Intelligence
Community

Coordinator, as now

Coordinator, as now

To CIA

Director, w/2 deputies
(perhaps as CIA EXCOM)

Director, w/2 deputies

To NSA*

Chairs EXCOM (DCI/DEF)

Chairs NSC EXCOM(I)
(DCI/DEF/State)

To NRO*

Chairs EXCOM (DCI/DEF)

Chairs NSC EXCOM(I)
(DCI/DEF/State)

To NSCIC*

No mention

Replace by NSC EXCOM(I)
chaired by DCI

To USIB*

Chairs, as now (implied)

Chairs Nat. Intel. Bd.
for nat'l intel. pro-
duction only

To IRAC*

Chairs, as now (implied)
(unless absorbed in
EXCOM)Replace by NSC EXCOM(I)
chaired by DCI

Responsibilities:

Fiscal*

Approves CIA budget,
Chairs NSA & NRO
EXCOM(s)NSC EXCOM(I) ~~APPROVES~~
~~recommends~~ CIA, NRO
and NSA budgets, DCIDept/Tactical Intel.
resources

None

~~manages CIA, Sec Def~~
~~manages NSA, NSA~~
None

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RELATIONSHIPS/
RESPONSIBILITIES

IOG OPTION 4

DCI OPTION X

Prod. of national estimates	As now	As now
Warning	As now	As now
Collection of intel.	As now	As now
Inspector General	CIA Only	CIA Only
Covert action	(Not addressed)	As now
Congressional spokesman	As now	As now
Staff support needs	As now (NIO & ICS)	As now (NIO & ICS)
Location	Not addressed	At Langley and at downtown D.C.
National/tactical problems (other than resources) *	Not addressed	NSC EXCOM(I)

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Option X - Collective Management

RATIONALE

This Option starts from the premise that stronger management of the Intelligence Community is highly desirable, but that the balance of interests reflected in the present structure is a realistic one and should be maintained. It presents a concept for achieving a degree of collective management while preserving present organizational relationships. It requires a minimum of legislative change.

SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

The DCI would continue to be advisor to the President, coordinator of the Community, and Director of CIA. The present structure of Committees and Boards would be consolidated into two, both chaired by the DCI: an Executive Committee of the NSC for Intelligence at the deputy secretary level, responsible for all Community management and policy matters, and a National Intelligence Board at the present USIB Principals level, responsible for substantive production. To enable the DCI to give more attention to his Community responsibilities he would be provided with a second deputy.

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PRIMARY CHANGES AND EFFECTS

The DCI's Responsibilities

The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence advisor, would be a non-voting member of the NSC, and would remain Director of CIA. He would be responsible, under the NSC, for the coordination of national intelligence policy and for the production of national intelligence. A clear distinction would be made, however, between his Community and CIA roles.

To this end, he would be provided with an additional Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. The present Deputy would be specifically responsible for managing the Agency under the DCI; the other Deputy would be responsible under the DCI for coordination of the Community. The DCI would have an Agency office at Langley and a Community office downtown, where his Community Deputy would be located.

Coordination of National Intelligence Policy

The present structure of boards and committees would be rationalized, on the basic principle that policy and resource matters requiring a balancing of

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departmental interests would be considered collectively by the senior officers controlling the assets and resources concerned. A separate forum would be provided for substantive intelligence issues, on the grounds that these are inappropriate for policy officers to adjudicate and that departmental interests are protected by the right of dissent.

For the first of these purposes the DCI would chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence, with Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense as members. The Committee would have under control of its members all important intelligence assets,* and would act as a board of directors for national intelligence. EXCOM(I) would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXCOM (NRO plus equivalent responsibilities for NSA), IRAC, and USIB (except national intelligence production). It would in addition coordinate policy matters affecting State and the Community, such as cover, technical collection bases overseas, and intelligence agreements with foreign countries.

*This assumes that under the new arrangement in Defense the second Deputy Secretary will control DIA, NSA & NRO.

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The DCI's "Community" Deputy would be his alternate in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence. The IC Staff would be the secretariat of EXCOM(I). The DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the NFIP (less its tactical and departmental components) with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOM(I) would have approval authority for the NFIP (CIA, NRO, NSA, and some elements of the GDIP) and its decisions would be binding. The DCI would have administrative authority only over CIA. Present administrative arrangements for the NRP and NSA would be preserved.

Production of National Intelligence

USIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelligence Board, limited by charter to substantive matters, and advisory to the DCI. The NIO's would act as the DCI's staff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his "Agency " Deputy as CIA member. The latter would serve as Chairman in his absence. Such a board might even be thought of as a Board of National Estimates.

Covert Action

The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate. Clandestine collection and covert action would remain assigned to CIA, without change in present arrangements.

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Oversight

Without administrative authority over the Community, it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes an Executive oversight mechanism at the NSC or White House level.

Congress

The DCI would continue to be the Community spokesman to Congress.

National/Tactical Problems

EXCOM(I) would handle matters relating to the relationship between tactical and national intelligence. The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical intelligence budgets of the military services, or for the service cryptologic agencies.

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11 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
Mr. Duckett
Mr. Proctor
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Blake
Gen. Wilson
Mr. Carver
Dr. Chamberlain
Mr. Warner
Mr. Cary
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Rogovin
Mr. Breckinridge
Mr. Bolten
Mr. Knoche

Herewith Option X as approved by the DCI this afternoon. He made very minor changes to the lunch-time draft, but wants this included in the Ogilvie paper. I suggested instead that we discuss tactics at the 9 o'clock tomorrow, and have asked Taylor to ensure that Ogilvie's paper is held open for this option if the DCI so decides at that time.

[Redacted Signature]

RICHARD LEHMAN

25X

Option X - CIA Emphasis

Rationale

This Option starts from the premise that CIA is a vital national asset that must be preserved and, if possible, strengthened. It recognizes that the DCI's power rests primarily on CIA, and that his authority over the Community, except for CIA, is limited. It assumes it will remain so. Under these circumstances his efforts to provide vigorous Community leadership conflict with his interests as Director of CIA. This option seeks to ameliorate this conflict by making a clear distinction between these two roles, and by providing a spokesman for CIA interests. At the same time it recognizes that effective Community management can only be achieved by a collective effort of the agencies involved, and presents a new concept of how this might be done.

Description

The DCI would remain Director of CIA, but would be provided with an additional Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. The present Deputy would be a civilian specifically responsible for managing the Agency under the DCI; the other Deputy would be

responsible under the DCI for coordination of the Community. The DCI would have an Agency office at Langley and a Community office downtown, where his Community Deputy would be located.

The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence advisor, and would be a member of the NSC.

The DCI would chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence, with Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense as members. The Committee would have under control of its members all important intelligence assets, and could act as a board of directors for national intelligence. It would not be advisory to the DCI but would work by consensus, with right of appeal to the President. EXCOM(I) would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXCOM (NRO plus equivalent responsibilities for NSA), IRAC, and USIB (except national intelligence production*). It would in addition coordinate policy matters affecting State and the Community.

The DCI's "Community" Deputy would be his alternate in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence. The IC Staff would be the secretariat of EXCOM(I). The DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the NFIP (less its tactical and departmental components) with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOM(I) would

* It would be inappropriate for policy officers to participate in substantive intelligence judgments.

have approval authority for the NFIP (CIA, NRO, NSA) and its decisions would be binding. The DCI would have administrative authority only over CIA. Present administrative arrangements for the NRP and NSA would be preserved.

USIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelligence Board, responsible only for production, and advisory to the DCI. The NIO's would act as the DCI's staff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his "Agency" Deputy as CIA member. The latter would serve as chairman in his absence. Under the policy direction of USNIB, the Deputy would become Executive Agent for production of the full range of national intelligence, drawing on departmental agencies as required and submitting products for coordination as USNIB directs. (The Board might even be thought of as sort of a Board of National Estimates).

The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate. Clandestine collection and covert action would remain assigned to CIA, without change in present arrangements.

Without administrative authority over the Community, it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes an oversight mechanism at the NSC or White House level.

The DCI would continue to be the Community spokesman to Congress.

EXCOM(I) would handle matters relating to the relationship between tactical and national intelligence. The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical intelligence budgets of the military services, or for the service cryptologic agencies.

Other Considerations

By stipulating that the DCI will coordinate policy and manage production, this Option recognizes reality and at the same time strengthens the DCI in his strong suit. Management issues usually involve the allocation of resources. It is here that the interests and weight of Defense are most important. Also these issues require decisions; once the money is spent the existence of a dissent carries no weight. Thus it is here that the DCI must be most ecumenical if he is to avoid charges of "partiality" to CIA.

Production issues are quite different. Here the DCI is supposed to be objective and free of departmental bias, and CIA's production elements are precisely the instruments whereby he is supposed to achieve this objectivity. Moreover, they are fully capable of holding their own against Defense. If the DCI is to be objective,

he must rely on and be "partial" to CIA. Here too, moreover, the right of dissent is effective; the DCI's judgment is permanently accompanied by any alternate views. The DCI is therefore able to take a much stronger position.

DRAFT #2

10 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Duckett
Mr. Proctor
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Blake
Mr. Carver
Dr. Chamberlain
Mr. Warner
Mr. Taylor

Herewith a revised draft of Option X. The DCI's schedule this afternoon is tight, and I may have to see him as early as 1:30. Barring objections from any of you, I will give him this at that time.



RICHARD LEHMAN

25X1

Option X - CIA Emphasis

Rationale

This Option starts from the premise that CIA is a vital national asset that must be preserved and, if possible, strengthened. It recognizes that the DCI's power rests primarily on CIA, and that his authority over the Community, except for CIA, is limited. It assumes it will remain so. Under these circumstances his efforts to provide vigorous Community leadership conflict with his interests as Director of CIA. This option seeks to ameliorate this conflict by making a clear distinction between these two roles, and by providing a spokesman for CIA interests. At the same time it recognizes that effective Community management can only be achieved by a collective effort of the agencies involved, and presents a new concept of how this might be done.

Description

The DCI would remain Director of CIA, but would be provided with an additional Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. The present Deputy would be a civilian specifically responsible for managing the Agency under the DCI; the other Deputy would be

responsible under the DCI for coordination of the Community. The DCI would have an Agency office at Langley and a Community office downtown, where his Community Deputy would be located.

The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence advisor. He would have cabinet rank, and be a member of the NSC.

The DCI would chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence, with deputy secretaries of State and Defense as members. The Committee would have under control of its members all important intelligence assets, and could act as a board of directors for national intelligence. It would not be advisory to the DCI but would work by consensus, with right of appeal to the President. EXCOM(I) would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXCOM, IRAC, and USIB (except national intelligence production*). It would in addition provide policy direction for the CCP and coordinate policy matters affecting State and the Community.

The DCI's "Community" Deputy would be his alternate in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence. The IC Staff would be the secretariat of EXCOM(I). The DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the NFIP with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOM(I) would

* It would be inappropriate for policy officers to participate in substantive intelligence judgments.

have approval authority for the NFIP and its decisions would be binding. The DCI would have resource authority only over CIA. Present arrangements for the NRP would be preserved.

USIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelligence Board, responsible only for production, and advisory to the DCI. The NIO's would act as the DCI's staff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his "Agency" Deputy as CIA member. The latter would serve as chairman in his absence. Under the policy direction of USNIB, the Deputy would become Executive Agent for production of the full range of national intelligence, drawing on departmental agencies as required and submitting products for coordination as USNIB directs. (The Board might even be thought of as sort of a Board of National Estimates).

The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate. Clandestine collection and covert action would remain assigned to CIA, without change in present arrangements.

Without effective authority over the Community, it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes an oversight mechanism at the NSC or White House level.

The DCI would continue to be the Community spokesman to Congress.

EXCOM(I) would handle matters relating to the relationship of tactical and national intelligence. The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical intelligence budgets of the military services.

Other Considerations

By stipulating that the DCI will coordinate policy and manage production, this Option recognizes reality and at the same time strengthens the DCI in his strong suit. Management issues usually involve the allocation of resources. It is here that the interests and weight of Defense are most important. Also these issues require decisions; once the money is spent the existence of a dissent carries no weight. Thus it is here that the DCI must be most ecumenical if he is to avoid charges of "partiality" to CIA.

Production issues are quite different. Here the DCI is supposed to be objective and free of departmental bias, and CIA's production elements are precisely the instruments whereby he is supposed to achieve this objectivity. Moreover, they are fully capable of holding their own against Defense. If the DCI is to be objective, he must rely on and be "partial" to CIA. Here too, moreover, the right of dissent is effective; the DCI's judgment is permanently accompanied by any alternate views. The DCI is therefore able to take a much stronger position.

DRAFT #1

Option X - CIA Emphasis

Rationale for this Option (Internal Use Only)

1. CIA is a vital national asset.
2. The DCI's control of CIA enables him to make a substantive impact at the NSC level and to be the covert action arm of the NSC. These two elements, along with his special position in the NRP, are the essential underpinnings of his power position.
3. The DCI's authority over the Community remains minimal. His efforts over the past two years to exert Community leadership have required that he not be a vigorous advocate of CIA's interests and have demonstrated clearly that emphasizing his Community role creates a serious conflict of interest.
4. It is not possible to increase the DCI's power relative to Defense enough to enable him to "manage the Community substantially better than he now does. Under these circumstances it is essential that CIA be preserved and strengthened.

5. This option therefore seeks to increase the status of the DCI in any way that does not affect his control over or the strength of CIA. It leaves unaffected Defense's present control over most intelligence resources, but provides the DCI with somewhat stronger and more coherent coordinating machinery. It assumes that he will normally view his CIA responsibilities as taking precedence over his Community ones.

6. Within these limits, it seeks stronger collective management for the Community.

Description

The DCI would remain Director of CIA, but would be provided with an additional civilian Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. This Deputy would be specifically responsible for managing the Agency under the DCI; the other Deputy, by statute military, would be responsible under the DCI for coordination of the Community. (Question: should the DCI's priorities be made explicit by the relative rank of these two officers?) (Question: physical location of DCI?) (of Deputies?)

The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence advisor. (He would have cabinet rank, and be a member of the NSC?)

The DCI would chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence, with deputy secretaries of State and Defense as members. The Committee would have under control of its members all important intelligence assets, and could act as a board of directors for national intelligence. It would not be advisory to the DCI but would work by consensus, with right of appeal to the President. EXCOM(I) would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXCOM, IRAC, and USIB (except national intelligence production*). It would in addition provide policy direction for the CCP, coordinate matters between State and the Community.

The Deputy Chairman (Executive Secretary?) of EXCOM(I) would be the DCI's "Community" Deputy, and the IC Staff would be its secretariat. The DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the NFIP with the assistance of EXCOM(I). (Question: could EXCOM(I) be given approval authority for the NFIP?) He would have resource authority only over CIA. Present arrangements for the NRP would be preserved.

* It would be inappropriate for policy officers to participate in substantive intelligence judgments.

USIB would be reconstituted as a (Foreign Intelligence Board?) responsible for production. It would be chaired by the DCI, with his "Agency" Deputy as Deputy Chairman (Executive Secretary?) Under the policy direction of USFIB, the Deputy would become Executive Agent for production of the full range of national intelligence, drawing on departmental agencies as required and submitting products for coordination as USFIB directs.

The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate. Covert action would remain a CIA function.

Without effective authority over the Community, it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes an oversight mechanism at the NSC or White House level.

The DCI would continue to be the Community spokesman to Congress.

EXCOM(I) would handle matters relating to the relationship of tactical and national intelligence. The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical intelligence budgets of the military services.

* The NIO's would logically come under this Deputy.

Other Considerations

By stipulating that the DCI will coordinate policy and manage production, this Option recognizes reality and at the same time strengthens the DCI in his strong suit. Management issues usually involve the allocation of resources. It is here that the interests and weight of Defense are most important. Also these issues require decisions; once the money is spent the existence of a dissent carries no weight. Thus it is here that the DCI must be most ecumenical if he is to avoid charges of "partiality" to CIA.

Production issues are quite different. Here the DCI is supposed to be objective and free of departmental bias, and CIA's production elements are precisely the instruments whereby he is supposed to achieve this objectivity. Moreover, they are fully capable of holding their own against Defense. If the DCI is to be objective, he must rely on and be "partial" to CIA. Here too, moreover, the right of dissent is effective; the DCI's judgment is permanently accompanied by any alternate views. The DCI is therefore able to take a much stronger position.